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THE PROBLEM OF SIMULTANEOUS DEATH IN THE LAW OF 










disaster”	 have	 occurred.	 In	 this	 paper	we	 intend	 to	 present	 the	 historical	 roots	 in	
Roman	 law	 (I.)	 and	 in	 authoritative	 codifications	 of	 the	modern	 age	 (II.)	 and	 to	
consider	 the	regulation	variations	of	 the	 issue	one	by	one	 (III.).	After	 that	we	 shall	
illustrate	 the	 differences	 between	 the	 effective	 Hungarian	 Civil	 Code	 (Ptk.),	 the	
amendment	and	 the	 settlement	based	on	 the	proposal	by	 some	practical	 examples	
(IV.);	then,	de	lege	ferenda	we	shall	sum	up	the,	in	our	opinion,	optimal	solutions	(V.).	
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I.	With	regard	to	the	regulation	of	inheritance	from	each	other	of	persons	who	
died	 in	 a	 common	 event	 /	 common	 disaster	 Roman	 law	 textbooks	 state,	 that	 the	
following:	 ”To	make	 it	easier	 to	decide	 inheritance	disputes,	 in	post‐classical	Roman	
law	 it	has	been	presumed	 that	 in	 circumstances	where	ascendants	and	descendants	
died	 in	a	common	disaster,	underage	children	were	deemed	to	have	died	before	their	
parents,	 and	 grownup	 children	 to	 have	 died	 after	 their	 parents.”1	 Yet,	 in	
circumstances	where	several	persons	who	are	not	relatives	die	at	the	same	time,	the	
source	takes	a	stand	for	simultaneous	occurrence	of	death.	To	examine	the	solution	
outlined	 first,	 we	 shall	 carry	 out	 in‐depth	 analysis	 of	 four	 of	 the	 seven	 loci	 in	
Iustinian’s	Digest	 and	 concerning	 the	 regulation	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 second	 option,	
four	from	among	the	twelve	texts	available	to	us.2	
I.	1.	In	Papinian’s3	fragment4	the	father‐in‐law	and	his	son‐in‐law	entered	into	






1	 	See	 e.g.	 T.	 Nótári,	 Római	 köz‐	 és	magánjog.	 (Public	 and	 Private	 Roman	 Law),	 Cluj‐Napoca,	 2011,		
p.	190.	
2	 	On	the	sources	disussed	in	this	paper	see	G..	Hamza,	Az	együtt	elhaltakra	vonatkozó	vélelmek	a	római	







the	child	dies	during	 the	 life	of	his/her	mother,	 then	 the	husband	can	keep	only	a	
certain	part	of	the	dowry,	on	condition,	as	a	matter	of	 fact,	 that	the	marriage	bond	
existed	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 woman’s	 death.5	 The	 mother	 and	 her	 child	 died	 in	 a	
shipwreck	 and	 as	 the	 order	 of	 death	 could	 not	 be	 determined	 subsequently,	 it	








father’s	 total	 property	 by	 referring	 to	 the	 son’s	 earlier	 death.	 The	 legal	 scientist	
refers	 to	 Hadrian’s	 rescriptum	 which	 deems	 the	 father	 to	 have	 died	 earlier,	 and	
accordingly	 decides	 the	 legal	 dispute	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 mother.13	 Although	 the	
fragment	does	not	specify	the	boy’s	age,	we	can	most	probably	assume	that	being	a	
grownup	young	man	he	took	part	in	the	war	together	with	his	father	as	a	soldier.14	A	
following	 fragment	 of	 Tryphonin15	 also	 specifies	 two	 possible	 variations	 for	 an	
inheritance	law	issue	where	the	simultaneous	death	of	the	father	and	his	son	–	who	
is	his	father’s	only	testamentary	heir16	‐	constitutes	the	basis	of	the	state	of	facts:	If	
the	 boy	 is	 grownup,	 then	 he	 shall	 be	 deemed	 to	 have	 survived	 the	 father	 and	 his	
                                                                                                                                                                  








8	 	See	also	A.	B.	Schwarz,	Die	 justinianische	Reform	des	Pubertätsbeginns	und	die	Beilegung	 juristischer	





11	Tryph.	 D.	 34.	 5.	 9.	 1.	 Cum	 bello	 pater	 cum	 filio	 perisset	materque	 filii	 quodsi	 postea	mortui	 bona	
vindicaret,	adgnati	vero	patris,	quasi	filius	ante	perisset,	divus	Hadrianus	credidit	patrem	prius	mortuum.	
12	On	 senatus	 consultum	 Tertullianum	 see	 C.	 Sanfilippo,	 Di	 una	 interpretazione	 giurisprudenziale	 dei	
senatoconsulti	Orfiziano	e	Tertulliano,	in	”Festschrift	F.	Schulz”.	I,	Weimar,	1951.	
13	Cf.	M.	 Kaser,	Beweislast	und	Vermutung	 im	 römischen	Formularprozess,	 in	 ”Zeitschrift	 der	 Savigny‐
Stiftung	für	Rechtsgeschichte,	Romanistische	Abteilung”,	71,	1954,	p.	239.	
14	G..	Hamza,	op.	cit.,	1976,	p.	350.	
15	Tryph.	D.	 34.	 5.	 9.	 4.	Si	Lucius	Titius	cum	 filio	pubere,	quem	 testamento	 scriptum	heredem	habebat,	
perierit,	 intellegitur	supervixisse	 filius	patri	et	ex	testamento	heres	 fuisse,	et	 filii	hereditas	successoribus	






refuted	 by	 proving	 the	 opposite.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 Max	
Kaser	considers	the	phrase	”nisi	contrarium	approbetur”	interpolation.17	
I.	2.	Ulpian’s	 fragment18	dealing	with	 the	validity	of	donation	between	marital	
partners	 first	 establishes	 that	 donation	 shall	 be	 invalid	when	 the	 donee	 dies	 first	
from	among	the	persons	taken	captive.	What	would	be	the	solution	if	both	of	them	
die	during	the	same	natural	disaster	(shipwreck,	fire)	and	it	cannot	be	determined	
who	 dies	 first?	 The	 legal	 scientist,	 referring	 to	 oratio	 Severi	 from	 206,	 considers	
donation	 valid	 because	 the	 donee	 shall	 not	 be	 deemed	 to	 have	 died	 earlier;	
accordingly,	donation	must	be	considered	valid	also	in	mutual	donation;	therefore,	
the	gift	 shall	belong	 to	 the	 inheritor.19	 If	marital	partners	making	mutual	donation	
provably	do	not	die	at	the	same	time	after	having	been	taken	captive,	according	to	
Ulpian,	 in	theory	the	following	solutions	can	be	taken	into	account:	on	the	basis	of	
fictio	 legis	 Corneliae20	 being	 taken	 captive	 is	 considered	 as	 it	 were	 simultaneous	
death,	and	in	this	case	donation	will	remain	valid;	the	marriage	terminated	already	
in	 their	 life	 in	 the	 moment	 when	 they	 were	 taken	 captive,	 and	 for	 this	 reason	
donation	is	invalid;	donation	will	be	valid	only	in	the	event	that	the	donee	survived	
the	donation;	and	the	donation	will	be	valid	only	when	the	donee	returned.	Ulpian	
presumes	 the	 first	 version:	when	being	 taken	 captive	 the	marital	 partners	died	 at	
the	same	time,	and	so	donation	can	be	considered	valid	–	in	his	solution	he	extends	
the	 presumption	 of	 simultaneous	 death	 based	 on	 fictio	 legis	 Corneliae	 through	
analogy	to	persons	taken	captive	simultaneously	as	well.21	
One	 of	 Tryphonin’s	 fragments22	 addresses	 the	 issue	 of	 validity	 of	 stipulatio	
aimed	at	returning	dos	receptitia23	and	made	subject	to	fulfilling	the	condition	of	the	














spectamus	 tempus,	 ut	 dicamus	 donationes	 valere,	 quasi	 simul	 decesserint?	 An	 neutram,	 quia	 vivis	 eis	
finitum	est	matrimonium?	An	spectemus,	uter	prius	decesserit,	ut	in	eius	persona	non	valeat	donatio:	an	









partners	 it	 arises	 as	 a	 question	 whether	 this	 condition	 has	 been	 satisfied.	 If	 the	
woman	had	survived	her	husband,	the	condition	of	the	transaction	would	not	have	
been	fulfilled	since	it	would	have	been	possible	to	consider	the	marriage	terminated	




Tryphonin’s	 fragment	 discussing	 the	 position	 of	 substitute	 inheritor25	 reveals	
the	following	state	of	facts:	the	testator	has	two	underage	sons	and	orders	Titius	to	
be	 the	 substitute	 inheritor	 of	 the	 son	who	 dies	 later;	 however,	 the	 two	 underage	
boys	die	 at	 the	 same	 time	 in	 shipwreck.	Whose	estate	will	 belong	 to	Titius?	 If	 the	
brothers	had	died	one	after	the	other,	the	one	who	died	later	would	have	inherited	
the	 property	 of	 the	 boy	 who	 died	 earlier,	 and	 so	 Titius	 as	 inheritor	 of	 the	 child	
having	 died	 later	 could	 have	 acquired	 both	 estates.	 Yet,	 Titius	was	 appointed	 the	
inheritor	 of	 the	 child	 who	 dies	 later,	 however,	 setting	 out	 of	 the	 presumption	 of	
simultaneous	 death,	 none	 of	 the	 brothers	 can	 be	 considered	 to	 have	 survived	 the	
other;	 according	 to	 Tryphonin,	 one	must	 set	 out	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 both	 brothers	
shall	be	 considered	as	having	died	 later.26	Marcian’s	 fragment27	 raises	 the	 issue	of	
inheritance	of	simultaneously	dying	substitutus	–	in	this	case	the	inheritor’s	sibling	–	
and	 the	 inheritor,	 and	 the	 inheritance	 of	 simultaneously	 dying	 siblings	 acting	 as	
mutually	substitute	inheritors	of	each	other	from	each	other	and	the	inheritance	of	




terminological	 remarks	 to	 the	 fragments	 that	 discuss	 the	 issue	 of	 simultaneous	
death:	The	phrase	”commorientes”	occurs	only	in	one	source.29	Nevertheless,	several	
times	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 read	 the	 phrases	 ”simul	 perierint”30	 or	 in	 singularis	 ”simul	





vita	 decessissent,	 priori	 mortuo	 frater	 ab	 intestato	 heres	 erit,	 posteriori	 substitutus:	 in	 ea	 tamen	
hereditate	 etiam	 ante	 defuncti	 filii	 habebit	 hereditatem.	 In	 proposita	 autem	 quaestione	 ubi	 simul	
perierunt,	quia,	cum	neutri	 frater	 superstes	 fuit,	quasi	utrique	ultimi	decessisse	 sibi	videantur?	An	vero	
neutri,	quia	comparatio	posterioris	decendentia	ex	 facto	prioris	mortuo	sumitur?	Sed	superior	sententia	












”simul	 functus	 sit”34,	 ”pariter	 decesserint”35	 and	 ”pariter	mortuis”36	 as	 well.37	 The	
source	of	danger,	which	results	in	the	simultaneous	death	of	several	persons,	is	not	
named	in	concreto	in	most	of	the	loci;38	the	possible	sources	of	danger	are	defined	in	
the	widest	scope	by	the	 fragment	 that	 indicates,	 in	addition	to	shipwreck,	collapse	
and	attack,	danger	in	general	that	threatens	with	occurrence	”in	some	other	form”39	




From	 among	 the	 cases	 quoted	 in	 the	 first	 group,	 the	 first	 two	 sources	 from	
Gaius	 and	 Papinian	 report	 the	 simultaneous	 death	 of	 a	 parent	 and	 his	 underage	
child,	 while	 the	 loci	 cited	 from	 Tryphonin	 gives	 an	 account	 of	 the	 simultaneous	
death	of	a	grownup	child	and	his	parent.	In	case	of	common	death	of	the	underage	
child	 and	 the	parent,	 experience	 of	 everyday	 life	makes	 it	more	probable	 that	 the	







and	an	adult	child;	 it	 is	 sufficient	 to	 think	of	 the	possibilities	and	circumstances	of	
the	destruction	of	a	young	adult	parent	and	his	just	grownup	child.	For	this	reason,	
legal	 scientists,	 being	 aware	of	 the	 fabricatedness	of	 the	presumed	order	of	 death	
themselves,	 support	 their	 opinion	 by	 general	 humanity45	 or	 a	 given	 imperial	
decree46;	and	in	certain	cases	to	assert	other	legal	law	aspects	they	take	exception	to	
applying	 the	 presumption.47	 Consequently,	 Roman	 law	 did	 not	 set	 up	 any	
presumption	of	general	validity	for	the	case	of	simultaneous	death	of	grownup	and	
underage	persons;	age	presumed	earlier	occurrence	of	death	of	any	of	the	persons	





















assumes	 simultaneous	 occurrence	 of	 death	 in	 case	 of	 common	 death	 of	 several	
persons,	and	based	on	this	praesumptio	iuris	 legal	scientists	rule	out	the	possibility	




II.	 First,	 we	 shall	 survey	 the	 relevant	 provisions	 of	 Code	 civil,	 then	 German	
codes	of	law,	more	specifically	ALR,	ABGB,	the	Saxon	BGB	of	1863	and	the	German	
BGB	of	1900,	after	that,	two	Anglo‐Saxon	laws,	the	British	Law	of	Property	Act	and	
the	 American	 Uniform	 Simultaneous	 Death	 Act,	 finally,	 Hungarian	 codification	
attempts.	
II.	 1.	 In	 Code	 Civil50	 we	 can	 find	 the	 presumption	 of	 the	 right	 of	 mutual	
inheritance	of	persons	who	died	in	the	same	event	(un	mème	événement),	based	on	
difference	of	age,	which,	however,	could	be	applied	only	subsidiarily,	 i.e.,	 in	case	 it	




occurring	 in	 the	 state	of	 facts	–	and	 in	 the	absence	of	 actual	 circumstances	on	 the	




highly	 complicated	 casuistic	 system,	 which	 states	 that	 the	 older	 from	 among	 the	
persons	younger	than	fifteen	years	old	who	die	in	the	same	event,	the	younger	from	
among	 the	persons	over	 sixty	who	die	 in	 the	 same	event,	 and	 the	 younger	of	 two	
persons	when	one	of	 them	is	under	 fifteen	and	the	other	one	 is	over	sixty	shall	be	
deemed	 to	 have	 survived	 the	 other.53	 From	 among	 a	 man	 and	 woman	 between	
fifteen	and	sixty	who	die	in	the	same	event	–	when	they	are	of	the	same	age	or	the	
difference	of	age	between	them	is	not	more	than	one	year	–	the	 law	presumes	the	
man	 to	 have	 survived	 the	 woman,	 and	 if	 they	 are	 of	 the	 same	 gender,	 then	 the	
younger	shall	be	considered	survivor	based	on	the	natural	order	of	their	obtaining	
the	 inheritance.54	 This	 latter	 rule	 places	 the	 presumption	 set	 up	 on	 a	 completely	
                                                            
49	Idem,	p.	359.	











année.	 S’ils	 étaient	 du	même	 sexe,	 la	 présomption	 de	 suivre	 quidonne	 ouverture	 à	 la	 succession	 dans	
l’ordre	de	la	nature,	doit	être	admise:	ainsi	le	plus	jeune	est	présumé	avoir	survécu	au	plus	âgé.	
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different	basis:	 so	 far	physical	capacity	 to	resist	constituted	 the	basis	of	 reference,	
while	here	reference	is	made	to	the	regular	order	of	inheritance;	the	former	cause	of	
reference	 is	 not	 necessarily	 valid	 because	 –	 as	 Hamza	 and	 Sajó	 notes	 –	 ”there	 is	
nothing	 to	 be	 said	 for	 the	 regular	 resistance	 to	 illnesses	 and	 suffering	 being	
authoritative	in	the	situations	regulated	here,	…:	in	the	case	of	an	exploding	aeroplane	




since	 it	 constitutes	 exception	 to	 the	 general	 rule	 on	 absentees56	 and	 to	 the	
”affirmanti	 incumbit	probatio”	 principle57,	 therefore,	 they	 apply	 it	 only	 to	 intestate	
succession	 by	 exercising	 interpretatio	 restrictiva	 and	 require	 identical	 cause	 of	
death.58	
II.	2.	 In	 its	provisions	applicable	 to	persons	who	died	 in	common	disaster	 the	
Preußisches	Allgemeines	Landrecht59	defines	the	term	of	gemeinsames	Unglück	–	later	
introduced	in	Hungarian	terminology	–	and	the	state	of	facts	of	simultaneous	death;	
in	both	cases	 it	orders	to	presume	death	that	occurs	at	 the	same	time	if	 the	actual	





the	point	 that	death	 occurred	 at	 the	 same	 time	 in	 the	 case	of	 both	persons.62	The	












Allgemeines	 Landrecht	 für	 die	 preußischen	 Staaten.	Wirkungsgeschichte	 und	 internationaler	 Kontext,	
Frankfurt	a.	M.,	1995.	





1987;	 Idem,	 Das	 österreichische	 ABGB	 als	 neuständische	 Zivilrechtskodifikation,	 in	 ”Vestigia	 Iuris	
Romani.	Festschrift	für	G.	Wesener”,	Graz,	1992.	







das	 Königreich	 Sachsen	 of	 1863	 –	 although	 within	 the	 personal	 and	 not	 the	
inheritance	part	–	regulates	the	issue	similarly	to	the	ABGB;65	in	other	words,	in	the	
absence	of	counter‐evidence	simultaneous	death	shall	be	assumed.66	In	accordance	
with	 the	 Swiss	 Zivilgesetzbuch67,	 when	 it	 cannot	 be	 proved	 that	 one	 of	 several	
deceased	 persons	 has	 survived	 the	 other,	 then	 death	 occurring	 at	 the	 same	 time	












legal	 system	 –	 is	 not	 applicable	 when	 the	 question	 of	 the	 order	 of	 death	 arises	
between	marital	partners;	 in	 this	case	 it	 is	not	possible	 to	refer	 to	presumption	of	
survival	 with	 regard	 to	 any	 of	 them;	 that	 is,	 none	 of	 them	 will	 inherit	 from	 the	
other.74	 In	 the	United	 States	 of	America,	 the	Uniform	Simultaneous	Death	Act	with	
almost	 identical	 text	 in	 all	 of	 the	 states	 from	 the	 1950’s	 regulates	 the	 issue	 as	
follows.	 Where	 property	 or	 other	 title	 depends	 on	 priority	 of	 death,	 and	
simultaneous	death	cannot	be	sufficiently	proved,	the	property	of	each	person	shall	
be	 considered	 as	 if	 such	 person	 had	 been	 the	 survivor.	 If	 the	 beneficiary’s	 right	
depends	on	whether	he/she	survives	 the	other,	and	simultaneous	death	cannot	be	
proved	properly,	the	entitled	party	shall	be	considered	a	not‐survivor.	In	the	case	of	
mutual	 beneficiaries	 the	 property	 shall	 be	 divided	 into	 equal	 parts	 in	 a	 number	










70	On	Bürgerliches	Gesetzbuch	 see	 J.	W.	Hedemann,	Die	Fortschritte	des	Zivilrechts	 im	XIX.	 Jahrhundert.	
Ein	 Überblick	 über	 die	 Entfaltung	 des	 Privatrechts	 in	 Deutschland,	 Österreich,	 Frankreich	 und	 der	
Schweiz,	Berlin,	1910–1935;	M.	John,	Politics	and	Law	in	Late	Nineteenth‐Century	Germany.	The	Origins	
of	the	Civil	Code,	Oxford,	1989.	








the	 beneficiary	 shall	 be	 considered	 survivor.	 So,	 the	 American	 regulation	 lets	 the	
principle	 of	 ”affirmanti	 incumbit	 probatio”75	 prevail,	 and	 when	 production	 of	









concerning	 persons	 who	 die	 in	 common	 disaster,	 and	 the	 reasons	 for	 declaring	




III.	 On	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 regulations	 looked	 at	 so	 far	 and	 the	 possible	 logical	





of	production	of	evidence,	as	 it	 is	set	out	 in	 the	currently	effective	Hungarian	Civil	
Code	(Ptk.)	as	well.	For	 lack	of	evidence	the	 judge	 is	compelled	to	take	a	stand	for	
simultaneous	death.	The	disadvantage	of	the	solution	is	that	total	freedom	of	proof	
and	 accidental	 factors	 of	 survival	 might	 make	 the	 parties	 apt	 to	 manipulate	 the	
facts.84	
b) In	case	of	unsuccessful	production	of	evidence	under	total	freedom	of	proof,	



















only	 as	 exception.	 This	 solution	 can	 be	 separated	 only	 logically	 from	 the	 above	
outlined	possibility	which	states	 that	only	substantiated	proofs	 taken	 into	account	
primarily	make	it	possible	to	eliminate	the	presumption	as	secondary	alternative.85	




possibilities	 that	 the	 parties	mutually	 inherit	 from	 each	 other	 as	 they	 died	 at	 the	
same	time;	 the	other	possible	path	 to	 take	seems	 to	be	 that	as	persons	eliminated	
from	 succession	 they	 do	 not	 inherit	 from	 each	 other	 since	 none	 of	 them	 can	 be	





IV.	After	 the	 logically	deducible	 regulation	models	 let	us	 look	at	 this	problem	
area	through	a	few	examples,	which	we	solve	on	the	basis	of	the	effective	Hungarian	
Civil	Code	(Ptk.),	the	draft	amendment	and	the	proposal.	In	accordance	with	Section	
600	 a)	 of	 the	 Civil	 Code	 a	 person	who	 dies	 before	 the	 testator	will	 be	 eliminated	





accident	 it	 is	necessary	to	clarify	the	 time	of	death	of	each	family	member	and	the	
order	 of	 death	 to	 be	 able	 to	 determine	 the	 order	 of	 succession.88	 Lack	 of	 the	
presumption	of	simultaneous	death	in	common	disaster	causes	serious	difficulties	in	
production	 of	 evidence	 when	 determining	 the	 order	 of	 death	 and	 the	 order	 of	
succession	of	 the	persons	who	die.89	We	agree	with	Lajos	Vékás	 that	 in	 this	case	–	
except	for	inheritance	under	a	will	–	chance	influences	the	order	of	succession.90	
The	 concept	 of	 the	 new	 Civil	 Code	 (Ptk.)	 would	 amend	 the	 effective	 text	
(Section	 600	 a))	 as	 follows	 ”a	 person	 who	 does	 not	 survive	 the	 testator	 will	 be	
eliminated	 from	 succession”.91	 The	 concept	 adduces	 the	 following	 reason	 for	













simultaneously	 died	 persons	 can	 be	 prevented”.92	 We	 are	 on	 the	 opinion	 that	 this	








inheritance	 from	 each	 other	 of	 persons	who	 die	 in	 ’common	 disaster’,	 today	much	
rather	 in	 a	 common	 accident	 or	 as	 a	 result	 of	 other	 similar	 event,	 actually	 not	
completely	at	 the	 same	 time—the	 inheritance	of	 the	person	who	dies	 later	 from	 the	
person	 who	 dies	 earlier”.93	 The	 concept	 provides	 the	 following	 reasons—in	 our	





them	 to	 the	 family	of	 the	 spouse	who	dies	 later.	Unfortunately,	 today	 such	accidents	
are	 not	 exceptional	 at	 all.”94	 This	 solution	 would	 provide	 succession	 only	 for	 the	
person	 who	 survives	 the	 common	 event	 indeed,	 irrespective	 if	 he/she	 was	 a	
participant	of	the	common	event.	













Code	 (Ptk.),	he/she	will	 inherit,	 and	 through	his/her	death	a	 few	minutes	 later,	 in	
accordance	 with	 Section	 608	 (1)	 of	 the	 Civil	 Code	 his/her	 parents	 will	 be	 the	









If	 we	 exclude	 inheritance	 from	 each	 other	 of	 persons	 who	 die	 in	 common	
disaster,	 then	 the	parents	of	 the	 two	 testators	 (Spouse	1,	 Spouse	2)	will	 inherit	 in	
















have	 died	 in	 an	 air	 crash,	 and	 the	 order	 of	 death	 has	 been	 determined		
(1:	mother,	2:	father,	3:	child)	
a)	 the	 child	 inherits	 from	 his/her	 parents	 but	 as	 he/she	 does	 not	 have	 any	
descendants,	 spouse,	 parents	 (because	 they	died	before	him/her)	 and	 the	parents	
do	 not	 have	 any	 descendants,	 the	 grandparents	 (in	 the	 absence	 of	 them	 the	
grandparents’	descendants)	of	 the	testator	(the	child)	will	be	 the	 intestate	heirs	 in	
equal	parts;97	
b)	the	planned	change	to	the	text	would	also	lead	to	the	result	set	out	in	point	
a).	 (Here,	only	simultaneous	death	 leads	 to	more	appropriate	 result	 than	point	a):	
the	deceased	persons	do	not	inherit	”from	one	end	to	the	other”	from	each	other,	the	
next	parentela	–	here	the	grandparents	–	will	inherit);	
c) exclusion	 of	 inheritance	 from	each	 other	 of	 persons	who	die	 in	 a	 common	
accident	 would	 also	 lead	 to	 the	 inheritance	 of	 the	 grandparents’	 parentela.	




 the	 deceased	 child	 does	 not	 have	descendants,	 spouse;	 so,	 his/her	 parents	
will	 inherit	 from	him/her	 in	equal	parts.	The	mother	(as	spouse)	will	 inherit	 from	
the	 father,	 due	 to	 elimination	 of	 the	 descendant,	 and	 through	 her	 death	 –	 in	 the	
absence	of	descendant	and	her	spouse	–	the	mother’s	parents	will	be	the	inheritors;	
in	other	words,	the	total	estate	will	belong	to	the	mother’s	family;	
















die	 in	an	air	 crash	and	 the	order	of	death	 is:	 1)	mother	2)	 father	3)	 common	
child	(the	separate	child	is	survivor	or	is	not	participant	of	the	accident):	
a. the	common	child	will	inherit	from	the	mother,	the	two	children	will	inherit	
from	 the	 father	 (half‐and‐half),	 after	 the	death	of	 the	 common	child,	 in	 the	






a	 common	event	 –	 irrespective	of	 the	order	of	death	–	 the	 common	child’s	
grandparents	 on	 the	 mother’s	 side	 and	 the	 father’s	 separate	 child	 would	
inherit	half‐and‐half.	
If	 the	order	of	death	changes:	1)	 father,	2)	common	child	3)	mother,	 then	 the	
following	solutions	can	be	outlined:	
a) the	two	children	will	 inherit	from	the	father	in	equal	parts,	 the	mother	will	













b) the	 draft	 text	 would	 lead	 to	 the	 result	 described	 in	 point	 a),	 only	
simultaneous	death	would	be	juster	than	that	because	through	the	succession	of	the	


























If	 the	 common	 child	 is	 followed	 by	 the	 mother	 and	 then	 by	 the	 father,	 the	
solution	 is	 identical	with	 the	 above:	 the	 common	 child’s	 parents	will	 inherit	 from	
him/her	 in	 equal	 parts;	 while	 the	 separate	 child	 will	 inherit	 from	 the	 father,	 the	
mother’s	parents	will	inherit	from	the	mother,	based	on	almost	all	the	three	texts	of	
the	 rule	 (effective,	 draft	 amendment,	 proposal).	 As	 a	 matter	 of	 fact,	 the	 situation	
outlined	 in	 the	above	 two	paragraphs	applies	 to	 the	property	of	 the	died	common	




lawmaker	 adhered	 to	 the	 provisions	 set	 out	 in	 the	 concept	 of	 2002.	 In	 6:4	
(Elimination	 from	succession)	 the	Expert’s	Proposal	of	200899	provides	as	 follows:	
”A	 person	 who	 does	 not	 survive	 the	 testator	 will	 be	 eliminated	 from	 succession.	
With	respect	to	inheritance	from	each	other,	persons	who	die	in	a	common	accident	
or	other	similar	emergency	situation	shall	be	considered	eliminated	from	succession	
irrespective	 of	 the	 order	 of	 the	 occurrence	death”.	 In	 the	 reasons	 attached	 to	 this	
requirement100	 the	 Expert’s	 Proposal	 expresses	 the	 codifier	 ’s	 intention	 not	 to	
regulate	this	scope	of	issues	by	presumption	because	”at	best,	by	legal	presumption	
the	order	of	inheritance	of	persons	who	die	in	common	disaster	can	be	determined,	












determine),	 the	 property	 of	 the	 testator	 (usually	 spouse	 or	 common	 law	 partner)	
should	 devolve	 within	 a	 short	 time	 to	 the	 family	 of	 the	 intestate	 (possibly	
testamentary)	 heir	 who	 just	 survives	 him/her”.	 As	 we	 have	 analysed	 it	 above	
through	 several	 specific	 examples,	 this	 solution	 leads	 to	 a	 fairer	 solution	 than	 the	










in	 a	 common	 accident	 or	 other	 similar	 emergency	 situation,	 and	 does	 not	 state	 it	
with	 respect	 to	 persons	 who	 die	 in	 the	 same	 common	 event	 within	 a	 short	 time	
following	each	other;	
‐	 if	 it	 is	 only	 persons	 who	 die	 at	 the	 same	 time	 that	 are	 eliminated	 from	
succession,	 then	why	is	 it	necessary	to	write	the	term	”irrespective	of	 the	order	of	
the	occurrence	of	death”	into	the	norm	text	since	there	is	no	order	of	death	in	death	
at	 the	same	 time;	 so,	 there	 is	 tension	even	within	 the	second	French	paragraph	of	







We	 can	 agree	 with	 the	 statements	 formulated	 in	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 new	




















cause	 that	 gives	 rise	 to	 death;	 whereas,	 ”common	 event”	 means	 the	 event	 that	
directly	evokes	death.104	Nevertheless,	the	term	common	event	needs	to	be	further	
narrowed:	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 it	 is	 necessary	 that,	 in	 addition	 to	 relation	 in	 time	 –	
simultaneity	–	relation	in	space	–	for	example,	identical	theatre	of	operations	in	war	
–	 should	 exist	 as	 well;	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 is	 an	 indispensable	 conceptual	
element	that	the	act	of	none	of	the	persons	should	be	the	cause	of	the	other	person’s	
death	–	one	should	think	of	a	person	who	kills	his	family	and	then	kills	himself	or	a	
person	 who	 gives	 help	 to	 somebody	 who	 gets	 into	 emergency.	 Yet,	 it	 is	 not	
necessary	that	the	cause	of	death	should	be	identical	in	case	of	both	persons	–	in	a	
shipwreck,	one	of	them	is	killed	by	fire	breaking	out	on	the	ship	and	the	other	one	













considered	 necessary	 only	 in	 cases	 where	 the	 lawmaker	 would	 expect	 different	
conduct	 indeed.	 It	 is	 needless	 to	 repeat	 the	 above‐mentioned	 basic	 principle	 of	
inheritance	law	with	regard	to	a	special	situation	since	we	might	deduce	it	from	this	
partial	emphasis	a	contrario	 that	 the	basic	principle	actually	does	not	exist,	and	 in	
every	 situation	 different	 from	 the	 hypothesis	 the	 contrary	 of	 just	 the	 disposition	
emphasised	here	should	prevail.106	
If	 we	 do	 not	 want	 to	 give	 room	 to	 complicated	 proving	 that	 promises	 little	






other	 of	 persons	 who	 die	 in	 a	 common	 event	 –	 and	 this	 event	 must	 be	 exactly	
circumscribed	 by	 using	 the	 above	 definition	 –	 should	 be	 excluded	 and	 should	 be	
inserted	in	the	Civil	Code	as	cause	of	elimination.	In	our	opinion,	owing	to	the	above‐
deduced	causes	of	legal	logic,	this	can	be	done	by	creating	irrefutable	presumption.	
	
